AT Epistemic modesty:

1. Leads to judge intervention – it’s impossible to tell when a framework is 55% won or a contention is 45% won – intervention is the worst harm to fairness and education since it takes the round out of debater’s hands which means other fairness or education concerns don’t even matter.

2. That presumes there is some intrinsic good to our acting morally rather than just the moral truth itself which is a utilitarian or aggregative notion – there is no benefit to acting in accordance with a suboptimal moral theory since that theory could not possibly be the true one if I win mine is comparatively better – and there is no good in acting slightly morally since a) it would not be moral at all and b) us acting on moral precepts has no independent value.

3. I will still win under epistemic modesty – my harms are the worst […]

[Extinction is not a huge harm – many animals still feel pain or pleasure – but mine is the worst possible harm.]

More problems:

1. once you change our confidence in a theory based on epistemic confidence you create cascading uncertainty. If you think util is 40% true, you might be only 50% confident that estimate is correct, and you might be even less confident in that number until you have no confidence in anything at all.

2. You also have uncertainty about the truth of epistemic modesty, which means it’s self refuting – you have to be epistemically modest about EM. This also leads to infinite regress since you will then logically have uncertainty about how to frame it and interpret it and then even less confidence in your interpretive theory and so on.

3. Assumes commensurability between ethics – but that is false. There is:

a) no cross theory to weigh the relative truth of each framework against

b) qualitative differences make comparisons impossible – the famous is Milton more puritanical than a pig is fat question

c) different ethics ask different questions – i.e. util evalutes end states, virtue evaluates character, deont evaluates maxims etc. so you cannot aggregate answers across theories d) assumes a particular model of good – if you believe in God, then you believe all offense is equally bad since it rejects an infinite person and then we should just take the most likely good action without comparing truth value.

e) assumes ethics is unequivocal – a religious thinker would say we should behave ethically to not go to hell, but if we only have 40% confidence in this religion and 60% in util I might still act according to religion since util can’t send me to hell. You assume all theories create the same motivations and answer the same ethical questions.

AT polls:

1. Your argument is self-refuting – you say moral norms must come from polls, but the idea that we look to the will of the majority is itself a moral norm that has not explicitly been agreed on by the majority – means we reject your framework under your standard. What if we took a poll and the majority decided we wouldn’t follow polls? We’d need to take a poll on whether to look to polls, a poll on when to poll people, a poll to determine how much to spend on polls etc. since every action taken without a poll to justify it would be illegitimate.

2. The government cannot garner legitimacy through raw democratic consent. **BEITZ[[1]](#footnote-1):** The difficulty is familiar and applies to virtually all attempts to justify civil government as a special case of freedom of association. The objection is simply that there are few, if any, governments to which all (or even some) of the governed have actually consented, and therefore that there are few, if any, governments that are in fact free associations. **Governments are not** like **voluntary associations** in the sense that people freely organize them, join them, depart from them, and dissolve them, according to the dictates of their desires and interests. **Governments are** more like **a fixed** part of the **social landscape, into which people are** born andwithin which all but the most fortunateare **confined** regardless of whether or not they expressly agreeto their terms of association.But if the institutions of the state are not like free associations in the sense that people can freely join them and depart from them, it still might be said that these institutions derive their legitimacy from the periodic reaffirmation of the support of their citizens perhaps voting, for example, can be interpreted as an act that implies the voter’s consent to his or her political intuitions;, as Locke maintains, perhaps the failure to depart signifies “tacit consent” to the obligation to comply with one’s government. It might even be thought that the failure to participate actively in political dissent is a sign of consent. Now, in fact, it does **no**tseem that any of these **acts** (or non acts) **would** be sufficient to **establish** the **legitimacy** of institutionsof government**. Political institutions have a** deep and **pervasive effect on** the prospect of **people living under them, on their preferences, and on their abilities to act or not act on** their **preferences.** In particular, **institutions define the process through which consent can** or cannot **be expressed and influence the** availability of the **means** necessary **to participate** in these process**. These institutions themselves stand in need of justification,** but such a justification cannot be provided in terms of consent.

I cannot vote until I have reached a certain level of knowledge, but I learn that knowledge within a society saturated by government control. For instance many people in the US went to a public school where we said the pledge of allegiance daily. Government authority instills a disposition to consent such that consent cannot retroactively legitimize the authority.

3. Polls are infinitely regressive because we don’t know how often we should re-poll or which form of public opinion is most binding.

4. Polls are not really what people – they are just a current mindset or attitude they hold at one moment. People often have contradicting points of view and transient preferences. That’s a reason why representative democracy is better since people are more likely to elect leaders that correspond to their general attitude toward issues.

5. Referendums or polls are terrible since the questions submitted are deeply totalizing toward individuals – they are highly restrictive and only allow space to check a box, even though opinions can be highly complex.

6. Democracy is an awful decision calculus since it mixes the opinions of experts and non-experts while giving equal weight to both of them, which means the aggregate decision is probably really bad and will screw over everyone. Representative democracy puts power in the hands of people who are more likely to understand the issues at hand.

7. The goal of democracy is to best represent the will of the people, but there is no allocation in democracy for inequalities of concern. The vote of someone who doesn’t CARE is valued the same as the vote of a deeply concerned person. That’s a reason why the will of the people should be determined by representatives who have a political stake in being responsive to the people.

8. Polls are paradoxical – they fall into a weird free-rider problem fallacy. **CHESTERTON:[[2]](#footnote-2) When** modern **sociologists talk of** the necessity of **accommodating** one's self to **the trend of the time, they forget that the trend** of the time at its best **consists of people who will not accommodate** themselves **to anything**. At its worst it consists of **many millions** of frightened creatures **all accommodating** themselves **to a trend that is not there**. And that is becoming more and more the situation of modern England. **Every man speaks of public opinion, and means** by public opinion, **public opinion minus [their] opinion. Every [hu]man makes his contribution negative under the erroneous impression that the next [person]'s contribution is positive. Every [hu]man surrenders [their] fancy to a general tone which is itself a surrender**. And over all the heartless and fatuous unity spreads this new and wearisome and platitudinous press, incapable of invention, incapable of audacity, capable only of a servility all the more contemptible because it is not even a servility to the strong. But all who begin with force and conquest will end in this.

9. TURN – at a meta-level most people empirically prefer a representative democracy to a direct democracy even if they disagree with specific policies, so there’s an obligation to do what current politicians suggest instead of presumed consent.

stats argument:

Polls aren’t genuinely democratic. Multiple warrants. **GANS**[[3]](#footnote-3)**:**

Polls have long been newsworthy, but never more so than when their conclusions can be compared to contrary politician behavior, the recent gun control debate being a particularly dramatic example. The pollsters’ finding that 90 percent of their respondents said they favored universal background checks for guns was juxtaposed (except by Fox News) with the Senate’s filibustered rejection of such legislation. More interesting and important, the news media turned poll respondents’ answers to pollsters’ questions into the expression of public opinion. In effect, the news media, and later many politicians, including President Obama, seemed to imply that the Republicans refused to listen to vox populi. Some may even have been thinking that the polls were sometimes a better instrument of American democracy than its elected officials. In one respect, the polls are more democratic; they report the opinions of a random sample of the entire population, while elected officials have been chosen by an electorate which at best includes 60 percent of the eligible voters and at worst many fewer. Thus, when 90 percent of poll respondents agree on the answers to polling questions, the polls are sending a message about majoritarian democracy. In other respects, however, polls are not the best representative of the popular will, for **people’s answers to poll**ster **questions are not quite the same as** their opinions — or, for that matter, **public opinion**. The **pollsters** typically ask people whether they favor or oppose, agree or disagree, approve or disapprove of an issue, and their wording generally follows the centrist bias of the mainstream news media. They **offer** respondents **only two sides** (along with the opportunity to say “don’t know” or “unsure”), thus **leaving out** alternatives proposed by people with **minority political views**. Occasionally, one side is presented in stronger or more approving language — but by and large, poll questions maintains the balanced neutrality of the mainstream news media. The pollsters’ reports and press releases usually begin with the asked question and then present tables with the statistical proportions of poll respondents giving each of the possible answers. However, the news media stories about the polls usually report only the results, and by leaving out the questions and the don’t knows, transform answers into opinions. When these opinions are shared by a majority, the news stories turn poll respondents into the public, thus giving birth to public opinion. Normally, the news story tells what proportion of that public favors the legislation being questioned or rejected by the Beltway politicians. Indeed, such polls are newsworthy in large part because the reportage is framed as a conflict between majoritarian opinions and politicians’ rejection of the popular will. To be sure, poll respondents favor what they tell the pollsters they favor. But still, poll answers are not quite the same as their opinions. **While** their **answers may reflect** their already **determined opinions, they** **may** also **express** what they feel, or believe they ought to feel, at the moment. Pollsters should therefore distinguish between respondents with previously determined opinion and those with **spur-of-the-moment answers** to pollster questions. However, **only rarely do pollsters ask whether** the **respondents have thought about the question** before the pollsters called, or whether they will ever do so again. In addition, polls usually do not tell us whether respondents have talked about the issue with family or friends, or whether they have expressed their answer cum opinion in other, more directly political ways. In fact, **respondents incur no responsibilities with their answers, no subsequent obligation to vote or do anything** else. Conversely, politicians can lose the next election with a vote that angers their base. If poll results can be interpreted as opinion, they are pollster-evoked or passive opinions. **They are not** the **active opinions of citizens who** feel strongly about, or **participate in some way in** the **debates about** forthcoming **legislation** or a presidential decision. Elected officials may take passive opinions into account but they pay far more attention to active opinions. Above all, however, politicians listen most closely to the usual suspects with power: influential citizens, Congressional leaders and whips, lobbies, and campaign funders. Jennifer Steinhauer of The New York Times was right on target when she described the poll results as an expression of “national sentiment,” which she then contrasted with the Senate’s “political dynamic.”

Polls are flawed in so many ways. **BPS**[[4]](#footnote-4)**:** Theories on Erroneous Polling Results A number of theories and mechanisms have been offered to explain erroneous polling results. Some of these reflect errors on the part of the pollsters; many of them are statistical in nature. Others blame the respondents for not giving candid answers (the controversial Bradley effect & Shy Tory Factor). **Non-response Bias** Since **some people do not answer calls from strangers or refuse to answer the poll**, poll samples may not be representative samples from a population due to a non-response bias. Because of this selection bias, the characteristics of those who agree to be interviewed may be markedly different from those who decline. That is, the actual sample is a biased version of the universe the pollster wants to analyze. In these cases, bias introduces new errors, in addition to errors caused by sample size. Error due to bias does not become smaller with larger sample sizes--taking a larger sample size simply repeats the same mistake on a larger scale. **Response Bias** Surveys may be affected by response bias, where the **answers given by respondents do not reflect their true beliefs.** This may be deliberately engineered by unscrupulous pollsters in order to generate a certain result or please their clients, but more often is a result of the detailed wording or ordering of questions. **Respondents may** deliberately try to manipulate the outcome of a poll by advocating a more extreme position than they actually hold in order to boost their side of the argument or **give** rapid and **ill-considered answers** in order **to hasten** the end of their **questioning. Respondents may** also **feel under social pressure not to give an unpopular answer**. In American political parlance, this phenomenon is often referred to as the Bradley effect. If the results of surveys are widely publicized this effect may be magnified in a phenomenon commonly referred to as the spiral of silence. **Wording of Questions** It is well established that the wording of the questions, the order in which they are asked, and the number and form of alternative answers offered can influence results of polls. For instance, **the public is more likely to indicate support for a person** who is **described** by the operator **as one of the "leading candidates."** A common technique to control for this bias is to rotate the order in which questions are asked. Many pollsters also split-sample in that one of two different versions of a question are presented to half the respondents. **Coverage Bias** Another source of error is the use of samples that are not representative of the population as a consequence of the polling methodology. For example, **telephone sampling has a built-in error because** in many times and places, **those with telephones have generally been richer** than those without. **Selection Bias** Selection bias occurs when some units have a differing probability of selection that is unaccounted for by the researcher. For example, **some households have multiple phone numbers making them more likely to be selected** in a telephone survey than households with only one phone number. In statistics, self-selection bias arises in any situation in which individuals select themselves into a group, causing a biased sample with non-probability sampling. It is commonly used to describe situations where the characteristics of the people which cause them to select themselves in the group create abnormal or undesirable conditions in the group. There may be a purposeful intent on the part of respondents leading to self-selection bias whereas other types of selection bias may arise more inadvertently, possibly as the result of mistakes by those designing any given study.

Poll methodologies are becoming increasingly outdated and there’s no consensus on how to do them right. **HAWKINS**[[5]](#footnote-5)**:** What gives? A recent New York magazine story offers a fascinating, compulsively readable feature on the chaos plaguing polling, “The. Polls. Have. Stopped. Making. Any. Sense.” That headline being the 46-character tweet sent out by polling wunderkind Nate Silver after a post-Democratic National Convention poll showed Obama beating Mitt Romney decisively in scarlet Wisconsin and Romney besting Obama in New Hampshire. Silver, of course, is the onetime baseball-stat geek whose uncanny knack for calling elections dead-on got his blog, FiveThirtyEight, picked up by the New York Times. He has a new book out, “The Signal and the Noise: Why So Many Predictions Fail.” The New York piece is truly worth a read. Its gist, which isn’t done justice by condensing here, is that while Americans are increasingly hungry for poll data, fewer and fewer media outlets are paying for polls, leaving the field to pollsters with skin in the game. 'Polling's dark age' At the same time, **conventional polling methodologies are increasingly outdated, to the point where** the **percent of potential voters contacted who** actually **agree to answer** poll questions **may be in the single digits**. And without reliable mechanisms for compensating, **outcomes are ever more dependent on “weighting,” or the pollster’s statistical adjustment for variables**. To wit: “The rising demand for trustworthy polling analysis also reflects something disturbing about the data itself. The central problem is that prototypically modern science is being disrupted by **new tech**nologies, which **have created a flood of new firms and new methods**. ‘We’re in sort of what I would call polling’s dark age,’ says Jay Leve, who runs the polling firm Survey USA. ‘We’re coming out of a period of time where everyone agreed about the right way to conduct research, and we’re entering into a time where **no one can agree what the right way to conduct research is**.’” And the release of a poll can have an immediate effect on a candidate or campaign, particularly late in the game when undecideds may find it tempting to join what looks to be the winning side. Will this October’s “surprises” be polls skewed to affect the outcomes of various contests? Stay tuned.

AT wash post:

This evidence is about public opinion polls for national security policy, not economic policy. **WASHINGTON POST**[[6]](#footnote-6)**:** Working with the Teaching and Research in International Politics (TRIP) project at the College of William and Mary, we have taken a first step to get a better sense of when and under what conditions policymakers pay attention to the work of academic social scientists. **Our** unique **survey of** nearly 1,000 current and former **national security decision-makers** (of whom 25 percent responded) **provides** the most **systematic evidence** to date **of what** the **highest-level national security decision-makers want from** academic **i**nternational **r**elations **scholars**. Among many other things, we asked about the usefulness of various approaches or methodologies for conducting social science research. For policymakers, the most useful approaches included area studies, contemporary case studies, historical case studies and policy analysis (see figure 1). As one respondent put it in the open-ended responses, “most of the useful writing is done by practitioners or journalists. Some area studies work is useful as background material/context.” Another cited “any analysis (e.g., in area studies) that gets at the UNDERLYING causes, rather than current symptoms, of problems has deep policy value.” A third listed “case studies — Kennedy School, Maxwell School, Georgetown-Pew” as an example of social science research that has been, is, or will be useful to policymakers in the formulation and/or implementation of foreign policy. Conversely, the more sophisticated social science methods such as formal models, operations research, theoretical analysis and quantitative analysis tended to be categorized more often as “not very useful” or “not useful at all.” Indeed, the only methodology that more than half of the respondents characterized as “not very useful” or “not useful at all” was formal models. To be sure, one respondent observed that “the work of scholars such as Howard Raiffa and Thomas Schelling in the area of game theory and systems analysis has been of great utility.” But more typical were the negative responses to our open-ended invitation for policymakers to “list an example of social science research that you believe has NOT been, is NOT, or will NOT be useful to policymakers in the formulation and/or implementation of foreign policy.” Some replies: — “Most formal modeling” — “Large-N studies” — “The time spent on computer modeling of international systems or conflict resolution is a complete waste. Much of the theory work is as well” — “Highly theoretical and quantitative analysis that seems to be more concerned about the elegance of the model than the policy utility” — “Many micro-economic models and fitting of history into larger theories is not very useful. Many professors do not want to influence contemporary policy.” — “Highly theoretical writings[;] complex statistical analysis of social science topics (except Economics). Writings that use arcane academic jargon” — “Most any quantitative study; virtually every article in APSR” — “Formal/game theoretical work and quant in Political Science — most of what passes as ‘methodologically sophisticated’ international relations work.” **One exception to policymakers’ aversion to quantitative social science was in the area of public opinion analysis**: Respondents included among “useful” approaches “public opinion research/analysis of foreign audiences by whomever.” Another argued that “polling data and its analysis is perhaps the most basic and certainly among the most useful such products.” Multiple policymakers specifically cited the Pew Research Center as doing useful survey research. Finally, a fourth agreed that “opinion polling can be very useful in trying to determine what populations think, especially in countries where freedom of expression is limited.” **Overall, we find that policymakers** do **regularly follow academic social science research** and scholarship **on national security affairs** in hopes of drawing upon its substantive expertise. But our results also call into question the direct relevance to policymakers of the most scientific approaches to international relations. It is worth noting, as the TRIP project reports, that the majority of articles in top international relations journals utilize these approaches, and graduate programs increasingly emphasize formal and quantitative training. To be clear, we agree with Farrell that “methodological sophistication is not a natural enemy of public interest.” Rather, we are making a more nuanced argument: That policymakers often find contemporary scholarship less than helpful when it employs such methods across the board, for their own sake, and without a clear sense of how such scholarship will contribute to policymaking.

AT coherentism = polls:

1. Coherentism is an internal not external phenomena. It is about my own beliefs cohering together not having my beliefs cohere with everyone else's.

2. Polls are the definition of a non-reflective judgement. They simply ask people what they think now, but coherentism requires reflective consideration of how well that judgment fits with everything else we know.

3. Polls are not a test of coherentism because there is not reason to expect that differing peoples beliefs should cohere. For instance, if I think everything is based on religious doctrine, and someone is an atheist I will not care about their opinions. You pressupose a set of background beliefs that provide form and context by which to analyze justification, but we do not share those background beliefs or agree with basic premises.

4. There arguments for coherentism contradict the conclusion. They say that foundationalism leads to a regress because you always need further justification. But the problem is that polls dont act as an insight that is basic. You have to take polls on whether you should take polls, assess the reliability of your poll, and so on.

5. Even if its true that coherentism does not lead to a regress of premises, it does lead to a regress of introspection. I require introspective access to my own grounds of justification, which is the fact that my belief coheres with all my other beliefs. but that means I need a reason to think that my belief coheres. But that reason for me to be justified must cohere leading to a regress.

AT habermas:

- We may use arguments for us each to discover ethical truth, but that doesn’t mean argumentation is intrinsically valuable as a component of that ethical truth. Just because truth is discovered through communication, it doesn’t follow that the communication is valuable. Oxygen is a prerequisite to discovering ethical truth since otherwise I wouldn’t be able to breathe and be an agent, but we don’t value oxygen.

- No reason why more communication or argumentation is better since there is no reason more people need to discover ethical truth at the point at which it exists anyway; that seems to presume our understanding of the truth is valuable in itself. We don’t all have to be moral; in any case discovery of ethical truth doesn’t make us moral.

- Doesn’t specify the content of ethical truths, so anything I read that is moral should be the correct conclusion. We might need to use others to find it, but affirming/negating is the only way to act consistently with it.

This is infinitely regressive because it says we ought to construct ethics with others but then says that these terms would be set to restrictions, however, we would need discourse for what these terms are, and discourse for the discourse of what the terms were, ad infinitum.

If individuals construct their own ethics, then that means they can never be wrong. Since there are no external standards to hold people too, then by definition people are not wrong if they construct a different moral system –for example, based on self-interest.

AT RULE UTILITARIANISM:

Rule consequentialism has the same calculative problems:

(\_\_) To determine the rule requires one to perform proper utilitarian calculation but your own framework acknowledges that must be done within the context of rules. Thus those rules themselves need rules for establishment creating a regress.

(\_\_) To interpret and apply a rule require its own calculation, those calculations must be subject to an inferential rule leading to a regress. It’s the inferential dimension of calculation, not the act-utilitarian qualities that create a problem.

(\_\_) There is no way to establish rules under the theory because of a type-token paradox. We say if an action is good because it falls under a good rule, but we know a rule is good only because it generally prescribes good actions. Thus there is no way to establish moral rules.

1) Rule-consequentialism contains an overarching commitment to maximize the good. It is incoherent to have this overarching commitment and then to oppose an act required by the commitment.

2) There are going to be a very complex and nuanced stream of rules under a rule util framework. Rule util begs the question of how to memorize these rules and apply them to situations in which quick decision-making is required – also means it’s counter-intuitive and turns back your reflective equilibrium warrants.

3) For every situation where compliance with some rule would not produce the greatest expected good, rule-consequentialism favors compliance with some amended rule that does not miss out on producing the greatest expected good. But if rule-consequentialism operates this way, then in practice it will end up requiring the very same acts that act-consequentialism requires – means it will still have the same problems like infinite calculation and coordination problems from adopting util decision making processes that act util does.

4) We need to use act util calculation to determine if a rule would generally lead to good consequences in the first place, so rule util is incoherent since we would still require act util calculation.

5) Rule util could justify deeply counter-intuitive rules – also turns your framework justifications since it proves that it’s not intuitive. **ROSS:** Jacob Ross, Professor at USC, “Derek Parfit.” There are, however, strong objections to rule consequentialist principles. Therefore, if the best versions of Kantianism and of contractualism imply that we act rightly just in case we act on such principles, these objections will count equally against Kantianism and contractualism. Indeed, one of the strongest objections to rule-consequentialist principles can be found in chapter 12 of *Climbing the Mountain*. The problem is that **there are principles whose universal acceptance would make things go best** or equal-best, **but that it would be clearly immoral to act on**. Consider the following principle: **“never use violence, unless some other people have used** aggressive **violence, in which case kill as many people as possible.”** This principle might well be a principle whose universal acceptance would make things go as well as possible, and hence a principle whose universal acceptance everyone would have sufficient reason to choose. For **if everyone followed this principle, then no one would ever use violence. But to follow this principle in the actual world,** where there will always be others who have used aggressive violence, **would involve killing as many people as possible.**

6) Double bind – either a) rules conflict all the time, which means they’re incoherent guides to action or b) they don’t, in which case rules would be very complex and hard to utilize – i.e. what rule would we appeal to when stealing in order to prevent a death, or killing to a avoid a theft? General intuitive principles always clash.

7) Disagreement precludes the possibility of application. **SINNOT-ARMSTRONG[[7]](#footnote-7):**

These theoretical alternatives have been described in very general terms that allow variations. Within the framework of public rule utilitarianism, for example, **people will disagree about what counts as a harm or a benefit, how harms and benefits are to be compared, who counts under ‘‘everyone,’’ what it means to be allowed, what constitutes knowing that others are allowed**, and which features of the act are morally relevant in a way that makes two acts instances of the same kind. **Different versions of** public **rule utilitarianism can be distinguished by their different** **answers** to these questions. To justify a belief in one particular version as opposed to another, the believer would need some reason to rule out each of the other versions. These details make a difference only at the margins. **At the margins, arguments will be scarce and weak. Moral intuitions will not be as clear. This makes it hard for anyone to be justified in picking one precise version** of public rule utilitarianism **as opposed to every other moral system**, including other versions of public rule utilitarianism that differ from this one only in minor details.

***AT REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM:***

1. Excessively vague – what does it even mean to account for our intuitions and judgments upon reflection. Begs the question of what external decision calculus to use to weigh intuitions and other judgments in the first place, which you need to complete such a sweeping survey of all our moral instincts.

2. No standard for intuitions – I think pain is bad, but not a masochist. Means you endorse an impossible ethic since we can never reach any conclusion or consensus.

3. Even if intuitions are important starting points for ethics, it doesn’t mean that they are inescapable – for example, morality itself is counter intuitive since sometimes I just want to do whatever I want, but we have a conscience to overcome that. It is possible to use practical reason, even though it’s not intuitive.

4. Reflective equilibrium begs an external standard since how we weigh theoretical concerns against our intuitions to arrive at conclusions itself requires an external means of determining how to evaluate each moral consideration.

5. Your examples only show one specific thing is moral, not that anything else is.

GENERIC DCT ANSWERS:

1. Ethic of God in control is contradictory since it begs the question of whether God can create a rock so big he couldn’t move it or a being more powerful than himself. Infinite power is paradoxical – means the entity your framework presumes is incoherent.

2. No reason why God is involved in ethics since God could have just created the universe and then stood by to let all affairs run their course. Proving that God had to have existed isn’t enough – you must prove God is involved in normativity. Severs the internal link from your framework to your standard.

3. Problem of evil puts you in a double bind - either God is evil and we should reject him or he’s impotent and irrelevant. **HARRIS:** Sam Harris, “There is No God (And You Know It), *The Huffington Post,* October 6, 2005. Only **the atheist** recognizes the boundless narcissism and self-deceit of the saved. Only the atheist realizes how morally objectionable it is for survivors of a catastrophe to believe themselves spared by a loving God, while this same God drowned infants in their cribs. Because he **refuses to cloak the** reality of the **world’s suffering in** a cloying fantasy of **eternal life**, the atheist feels in his bones just how precious life is -- and, indeed, how unfortunate it is that millions of human beings suffer the most harrowing abridgements of their happiness for no good reason at all. Of course, **people of faith [claim]** regularly assure one another that **God is not responsible for** human **suffering. But how** else **can we understand the claim that God is both omniscient and omnipotent?** There is no other way, and it is time for sane human beings to own up to this. This is the age-old problem of *theodicy*, of course, and we should consider it solved. If God exists, **either He can do nothing to stop** the most egregious **calamities, or He does not care to. God**, therefore, **is either impotent or evil.** Pious readers will now execute the following pirouette: *God cannot be judged by merely human standards of morality*. But, of course, human standards of morality are precisely what the faithful use to establish God’s goodness in the first place. And any God who could concern himself with something as trivial as gay marriage, or the name by which he is addressed in prayer, is not as inscrutable as all that. If He exists, the God of Abraham is not merely unworthy of the immensity of creation; he is unworthy even of man. There is another possibility, of course, and it is both the most reasonable and least odious: the biblical God is a fiction. As Richard Dawkins has observed, we are all atheists with respect to Zeus and Thor. Only the atheist has realized that the biblical god is no different. Consequently, **only the atheist is compassionate enough to take** the profundity of the world’s **suffering at face value**. It is terrible that we all die and lose everything we love; it is doubly terrible that so many human beings suffer needlessly while alive. That so much of this suffering can be directly attributed to religion -- to religious hatreds, religious wars, religious delusions, and religious diversions of scarce resources -- is what makes atheism a moral and intellectual necessity**.** It is a necessity, however, that places the atheist at the margins of society. The atheist, by merely being in touch with reality, appears shamefully out of touch with the fantasy life of his neighbors.

A God who is benevolent is contradictory since they would not logically permit the suffering that goes on in the world. If they were truly benevolent, they would intervene.

4. Existence itself denies your framework –

a) An omnipotent and omniscient being would have no reason to act by creating the universe because it would have no needs; these concepts are subjectively human. Since the universe exists there is a contradiction and God cannot exist.

b) God should have created perfect humans since he is in perfect control – the fact that he didn’t is irrational and proves no God exists.

5. Your framework devolves to determinism:

a) If God already knows the future, then humanity is destined to corroborate with his knowledge of the future and not have true free will to deviate from it.

b) God is all powerful so he can always see that the world accords with his conception of the good. If something hasn’t happened yet, we know God doesn’t want it to happen.

AT trivialism:

The nature of a tautology is very specific; it does not describe the world but merely functions within the realm of language. **KEMERLING:**[[8]](#footnote-8)

On Wittgenstein's view, **the world consists entirely of facts.** (Tractatus 1.1**) Human beings are aware of** the **facts by virtue of** our mental **representations** or thoughts**, which are most fruitfully understood as picturing the way things are**. (Tractatus 2.1) **These** thoughts are**, in turn, express**edin **propostitions, whose form indicates the position of these facts within** the nature of **reality** as a whole and whose content presents the truth-conditions under which they correspond to that reality. (Tractatus 4) **Everything that is true—**that is, **all the facts that constitute the world—**can in principle be expressed by atomic sentences. **Imagine a** comprehensive **list of** all the **true sentences. They would picture** all of the facts there are, and this would be an adequate representation of **the world as a whole.** The **tautological expressions** of logic **occupy a special role in this** language-**scheme. Because they are true under all conditions whatsoever, tautologies are literally nonsense: they convey no information about what the facts truly are.** But since they are true under all conditions whatsoever**, tautologies reveal the** underlying **structure** **of** all **language**, thought, and reality. (Tractatus 6.1) Thus, on Wittgenstein's view, the most significant logical features of the world are not themselves additional facts about it.

This functions to prove that tautologies are meaningless and thus cant be affirmed as they lack anything but empty form. Additionally system that do not describe the world but merely the realm of language must be abandoned at the moment of conception. **KEMERLING (2):**

**This is the major theme of the Tractatus as a whole: since propositions merely express facts** about the world, **propositions in themselves are entirely devoid of value**. The **facts are just** the **facts.** **Everything else,** everything about which we care, everything **that** **might render the world meaningful, must reside elsewhere**. (Tractatus 6.4) **A** properly **logical language**, Wittgenstein held, **deals only with what is true.** Aesthetic judgments about what is beautiful and **ethical judgments about what is good cannot even be expressed within the logical language, since they transcend what can be pictured in thought.** **They aren't facts. The achievement of a wholly satisfactory description of the way things are would leave unanswered** (but also unaskable) **all of the most significant questions with which traditional philosophy was concerned.** (Tractatus 6.5) Thus, even the philosophical achievements of the Tractatus itself are nothing more than useful nonsense; **once appreciated, they are** themselves **to be discarded. The book concludes** with the lone statement: "**Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent." (**Tractatus 7) **This** is a stark message indeed, for **it renders literally unspeakable** so **much of human life**. As Wittgenstein's friend and colleague Frank Ramsey put it, "What we can't say we can't say, and we can't whistle it either." It was this carefully-delineated sense of what a logical language can properly express that influenced members of the Vienna Circle in their formulation of the principles of logical positivism. Wittgenstein himself supposed that **there was nothing left for philosophers to do**. True to this conviction, he abandoned the discipline for nearly a decade.

The implication is that we must abandon tautologies the moment they are conceived and cannot be affirmed. Third you can’t affirm tautologies as they render the resolution utterly devoid of meaning. The term in the resolution when it becomes a tautology is rendered merely an empty signifier. This means the resolution no longer describes the world but merely expresses an empty form, it says X is X, rather than making any statement that is truth functional and can correspond to reality. However the form itself because it lacks meaning but merely a definition of meaning functions to undermine the meaning of the resolution proved in the affirmative case.

AT relativism:

Moral agreement:

Even simple conversation proves that moral agreement about basic standards like fairness and promise-making exists. **C.S. LEWIS:[[9]](#footnote-9)** Every one has heard people quarrelling. Sometimes it sounds funny and sometimes it sounds merely unpleasant; but however it sounds, I believe we can learn something very important from listening to the kind of things they say. **They say things like** this: **"How'd you like it if anyone did the same to you?"-"That's my seat, I was there first"-"Leave him alone, he isn't doing you any harm"- "Why should you shove in first?"-"Give me a bit of your orange, I gave you a bit of mine"-"Come on, you promised."** People say things like that every day, educated people as well as uneducated, and children as well as grown-ups. Now what interests me about all these remarks is that **the man who makes them is** not merely saying that the other man's behaviour does not happen to please him. He is **appealing to some kind of standard of behaviour** which he expects the other man to know about. And **the other man very seldom replies: "To hell with your standard." Nearly always he tries to make out that what he has been doing does not really go against the standard, or that if it does there is some special excuse.** He pretends there is some special reason in this particular case why the person who took the seat first should not keep it, or that things were quite different when he was given the bit of orange, or that something has turned up which lets him off keeping his promise. It looks, in fact, very much as if **both parties had in mind some kind of Law or Rule of fair play or decent behaviour or morality or whatever you like to call it, about which they really agreed. And they have.** If they had not, they might, of course, fight like animals, but they could not quarrel in the human sense of the word. Quarrelling means trying to show that the other man is in the wrong. And there would be no sense in trying to do that unless you and he had some sort of agreement as to what Right and Wrong are; just as there would be no sense in saying that a footballer had committed a foul unless there was some agreement about the rules of football.

Cultural relativism is overstated. **C.S. LEWIS: There have been differences between their moralities, but these have never amounted to anything like a total difference**. If anyone will take the trouble to compare the moral teaching of, say, the ancient Egyptians, Babylonians, Hindus, Chinese, Greeks and Romans, what will really strike him will be how very like they are to each other and to our own. Some of the evidence for this I have put together in the appendix of another book called The Abolition of Man; but for our present purpose I need only ask the reader to think what a totally different morality would mean. **Think of a country where people were admired for running away in battle, or where a man felt proud of double-crossing all the people who had been kindest to him. You might just as well try to imagine a country where two and two made five.** Men have differed as regards what people you ought to be unselfish to-whether it was only your own family, or your fellow countrymen, or everyone. But they have always agreed that you ought not to put yourself first. **Selfishness has never been admired. Men have differed as to whether you should have one wife or four. But they have always agreed that you must not simply have any woman you liked.**

1. Moral disagreement only proves the existence of a real morality since we must believe moral progress exists. **CS LEWIS:[[10]](#footnote-10)** There are two reasons for saying it belongs to the same class as mathematics. The first is, as I said in the first chapter, that though there are differences between the moral ideas of one time or country and those of another, the differences are not really very great-not nearly so great as most people imagine-and you can recognise the same law running through them all: whereas mere conventions, like the rule of the road or the kind of clothes people wear, may differ to any extent. The other reason is this. When you think about these differences between the morality of one people and another, **do you think that the morality of one people is ever better or worse** than that of another? **Have any of the changes been improvements? If not, then there could never be any moral progress.** Progress means not just changing, but changing for the better. **If no set of moral ideas were truer or better** than any other, **there would be no sense in preferring civilized morality to savage morality, or Christian morality to Nazi morality.** In fact, of course, **we all do believe that some moralities are better than others. We do believe that some of people who tried to change the moral ideas of their own age were** what we would call Reformers or **Pioneers-people who understood morality better than their neighbors did**. Very well then. **The moment you say that one set of moral ideas can be better than another, you are**, in fact, **measuring them both by a standard, saying that one of them conforms to that standard more nearly than the other. But the standard that measures two things is something different from either. You are**, in fact, **comparing them both with some Real Morality**, admitting that there is such a thing as a real Right, **independent of what people think, and that some people's ideas get nearer to that real Right than others**. Or put it this way. If your moral ideas can be truer, and those of the Nazis less true, there must be something-some Real Morality-for them to be true about**.** The reason why your idea of New York can be truer or less true than mine is that New York is a real place, existing quite apart from what either of us thinks. If when each of us said "New York" each meant merely "The town I am imagining in my own head," how could one of us have truer ideas than the other? There would be no question of truth or falsehood at all. In the same way, if the Rule of Decent Behaviour meant simply "whatever each nation happens to approve," there would be no sense in saying that any one nation had ever been more correct in its approval than any other; no sense in saying that the world could ever grow morally better or morally worse.

2. Even if there are no facts, there are facts about what to believe according to the theories we accept. It is sufficient for me to establish an ethical theory that you accept and relative to that theory we have specific obligations. Even if we can’t establish a moral theory is general, we can still establish one in this round.

3. Just because each person has a unique perspective, it doesn’t mean that a) they cannot reach ethical agreement or b) that some objective moral theory does not exist. It may be the case that moral theory is X is true and exists, but people just don’t see it, believe it, or understand it. If X says the world is flat, and Y says it’s round, one of them is CORRECT. Relativism doesn’t mean there isn’t any ethical truth.

4. Relativism is self-defeating. **KELLER[[11]](#footnote-11):**. In his book A Rumor of Angels Berger recounts how the twentieth century had uncovered “the sociology of knowledge,” namely that people believe what they do largely because they are socially conditioned to do so. We like to think that we think for ourselves, but it is not that simple. We think like the people we most admire and need. Everyone belongs to a community that reinforces the plausibility of some beliefs and discourages others. Berger notes that many have concluded from this fact that, because we are all locked into our **[there are] historical and cultural locations**, it is impossible to judge the rightness or wrongness of competing beliefs. Berger goes on, however, to point out that **[but]** **absolute relativism can only exist if the relativists exempt themselves from their own razor.** **If you infer** from the social conditioned-ness of all belief **that “no belief can be** held as universally **true for everyone,” that** itself **is a** comprehensive **claim about everyone that is the product of social conditions—so it cannot be true,** on its own terms. “**Relativity relativizes itself**,” says Berger, so we can’t have relativism “all the way down.”10 Our cultural biases make weighing competing truth-claims harder, yes. The social conditionedness of belief is a fact, but it cannot be used to argue that all truth is completely relative or else the very argument refutes itself. Berger concludes that we cannot avoid weighing spiritual and religious claims by hiding behind the cliché that “there’s no way to know the Truth.” We must still do the hard work of asking: which affirmations about God, human nature, and spiritual reality are true and which are false? We will have to base our life on some answer to that question. The philosopher Alvin Plantinga has his own version of Berger’s argument. People often say to him, “If you were born in Morocco, you wouldn’t even be a Christian, but rather a Muslim.” He responds: Suppose we concede that if I had been born of Muslim parents in Morocco rather than Christian parents in Michigan, my beliefs would have been quite different. [But] the same goes for the pluralist…. If the pluralist had been born in [Morocco] he probably wouldn’t be a pluralist. Does it follow that…his pluralist beliefs are produced in him by an unreliable belief-producing process?11 Plantinga and Berger make the same point. You can’t say, “All claims about religions are historically conditioned except the one I am making right now.” If you insist that no one can determine which beliefs are right and wrong, why should we believe what you are saying? The reality is that **we all make truth-claims of some sort** and it is very hard to weigh them responsibly, but **we have no alternative but to try** to do so.

Since people disagree about the value of relativism, it’s truth value would be itself relative and thus indeterminable – proves your framework is self-refuting.

More answers:

If disagreement means we’re not finding truth, there is similar disagreement in all types of philosophy and every type of applied science or sociology. This seems too much of a pill to swallow – it means we can’t even believe the world is round or that evolution is true.

Doesn’t mean there aren’t moral facts and is false. **SINNOT-ARMSTRONG[[12]](#footnote-12):**

In any case, the most important response here is this: even if the pattern of **moral disagreements** were best explained by ways of life, that would s**how at most that those disputes reflect ways of life. It would not follow that there are no objective moral facts**. The first point is that Mackie’s argument is about our beliefs, not about facts. Grant that the believer’s way of life affects every moral belief. Still, s**ome ways of life might distort moral beliefs, while other ways of life enable** people to see the moral facts and form true moral beliefs. If so, differences among ways of life explain the pattern of moral disagreements, but **this explanation** of beliefs **is compatible with moral facts.** Moreover, our ways of life might not affect all of our moral beliefs. Even if we need to cite ways of life to explain moral disagreements, we do not need to cite ways of life to explain moral beliefs when people agree. **Mackie does not try to show that there is disagreement on every moral issue**, so it is hard to see how his argument could support a universal denial of all moral facts. Moreover, there do seem to be many uniformities in moral belief. **Almost everyone believes that it is morally wrong to torture babies just for fun, to break promises to peers just to gain advantages over them, to kill friends who cook you dinner (even if the dinner tastes bad), and so on.** The agreement on these qualified claims might not be universal, because of moral nihilists, but the range of agreement is striking. Defenders of moral facts can claim that there are moral facts in these areas of agreement, even if not elsewhere.

If we accept relativism, we would be unable to hold any other beliefs whatsoever since we would have to conclude our own beliefs lack truth value. **BOGHOSSIAN[[13]](#footnote-13): The trouble is** that, as we have already seen**, it is crucial to the relativist’s view that thinkers accept one or another** of these **system**s**, that they endorse one or another** of them and **then talk about what they do and do not permit. Otherwise we could not** even **make sense of the idea [of] that Galileo thinks he has a relative reason for believing Copernicanism while Bellarmine thinks he has a relative reason for rejecting it. But how could we go on accepting one or another of these epistemic systems, once we have bought in on the relativist’s central thought that there are no absolute facts about justification and so have come to conclude that they are made up out of uniformly false propositions?”**

AT contractarianism:

Sinnot-Armstrong:

1. Gauthier already assumes moral claims independent of self-interest. **SINNOT-ARMSTRONG[[14]](#footnote-14):** Nonetheless, it is hard to see how Gauthier could show that his moral theory is complete. **Why can’t there be any moral constraints without reciprocity? Because not all rational people would accept them. But then why can’t there be any moral constraints that not all rational people accept?** Gauthier responds, ‘‘The con- tractarian insists that a society could not command the willing allegiance of a rational person if, without appealing to her feelings for others, it afforded her no expectation of net benefit’’ (1986, 11; cf. 238). **The point cannot be that society is unable to command such allegiance. Commands can be issued.** Maybe Gauthier is saying that society could not successfully command such allegiance, since oth- erwise compliance would not be stable (1991, 29), but this is mere wishful thinking, since **stable societies have often been based on force, not reason.** So **Gauthier seems to be saying that it is not fair to constrain rational people without benefit to them. This assumption is a substantive moral claim of the very kind that Gauthier was supposed to avoid.** So it is hard to see how Gauthier could justify his claim to completeness without violating his own methodological limits.

2. Begs the question of what is rational. **SINNOT-ARMSTRONG[[15]](#footnote-15):**

Many objections could be raised against Gauthier’s argument. (Cf. Vallentyne 1991; and Paul et al. 1988.) Some critics reject Gauthier’s theory of rationality (Gert 1990). Gauthier raises difficulties for some competing views of rationality, but he admits, ‘‘We cannot expect to resolve this conflict in a way that all will find con- vincing or even plausible’’ (1986, 55). This lack of resolution is crucial for moral epistemology, especially with contrast classes. **If we are not justified in accepting Gauthier’s theory of rationality** in contrast with one of its competitors, then **we are not justified in using his theory** of rationality to reach any moral conclusion as opposed to the alternative that would result from the competing theory of rationality. After all, **philosophers can always define ‘‘rational’’ so that their favorite moral system would be chosen by all rational people.** Utilitarians, for example, could say that people are rational only if they maximize utility for all, and then all rational people would agree on utilitarianism of some (possibly indirect) kind. **That method would**, however, **clearly beg the question against contrary moral beliefs as long as the premises about rationality remain unjustified.**

3. Completely empty– the fact that people would agree to this system does not prove its truth in any robust sense. **SINNOT-ARMSTRONG[[16]](#footnote-16):** However, there is no way to justify a claim that all people who are rational in this way would accept a certain moral belief without already having separate evidence for that moral belief. The agreement would not add any new evidence, since contractors agree only because of prior evidence. So, rational agreement of this kind cannot be a separate source of justified moral belief. In any case, **contractarians** do not refer to such epistemic rationality. They **see people as rational to the extent that these people seek or obtain good effects and avoid bad effects. But** then, **if all rational people accept a belief** or rule, **this must be because acceptance brings good effects or avoids bad effects**. **Such effects do not show that a moral belief is true** or even likely to be true. To see this, **suppose that someone will kill anyone who does not believe in Santa Claus, and everyone knows this.** Then **everyone who is rational** in the relevant way **would accept** (or try to accept) **the belief in Santa Claus. But this agreement does not provide any evidence that Santa Claus exists.** Similarly, **to show that all rational people would accept certain moral beliefs** as ways **to** protect or **improve their lives or society does not show that these beliefs are** either likely to be true or **justified** epistemically.

Compare to the AC framework:

1. There is no way to specify the content of a contracts principle and thus no way to have a set principle of mutual compliance.
   1. We don’t know how specific to the various situations we have to be in constructing the rules.
   2. We cannot index the interest of every person at any given time. But this forces us to make separate contracts with various individuals and groups not all of which will be able to correspond.
   3. We cannot effectively specify the values of others, making it impossible to know the specific contracts they would rationally consent to.
2. Double bind. There is no binding reason why people should have to act in their self-interest and thus no reason that contractarianism is binding. However, that means contractarianism fails to be prescriptive of moral content, but also fails descriptively by failing to accord with basic moral intuitions like an obligation to give to charity.
3. Contracts only make sense within a preexisting moral sphere like AC. In the same way you cannot know what is constitutional without a paradigm of constitutional interpretation like spirit of the law, you cannot effectively correspond to abstract contracts without a preexisting binding set of ethical and communicative norms that people would follow.
4. Contractors will still be motivated by passions after contracts are drawn up, and so will fail to comply with them. Even if they reason to create the contract, then rational actors will not comply with the social contract any more than they would cooperate with each other before it’s made. The reason for their inability to cooperate without the contract cannot continue to operate after the contract is made. If interaction were only valuable to self-interested actors, those cooperators could not solve the compliance problem.
5. Contractarianism starts from skepticism and moves towards ethics, but such an account always fails
   1. Within the skeptical hypothesis I have no obligation to think clearly or rationally about my situation and thus no binding reason to construct the ethical system.
   2. The notion of being ethically bound is a basic notion. We cannot derive from contracts the idea of being bound to contracts unless being bound was already a normative category.

the new impact justification:

Your standard is implicitly impact justified and appeals to consequentialist ideals. Bracketed for clarity. **MASSEY[[17]](#footnote-17):** When I debated five years ago, it was common to hear frameworks like this: “The standard is minimizing terrorism. Terrorism kills [#] people every year, making it the largest threat to civilians worldwide. Terrorism destabilizes the international community, causing wars, etc.” Then, debaters started pointing out that these frameworks were *impact-justified*: they assumed consequentialism without justifying it and used weighing arguments as standards-justifications. Impact-justified frameworks artificially excluded other consequentialist impacts and artificially inflated the importance of marginal links to their standard. (Even if annually terrorism kills more people than bee stings, a marginal link to terrorism might be outweighed by a huge link to bee stings.) This realization was the biggest advance for framework debate in recent memory. Impact-justified frameworks virtually disappeared, and debaters got down to the real task of justifying the underlying weighing mechanism (consequentialism, deontology, etc.). Framework and contention debates started to make much more sense.

But recently, **impact-justified frameworks** have returned in a subtler and thus more pernicious form. Consider the following framework arguments I’ve actually heard in rounds: 1. “The community is necessary to formulate morality. Thus, the standard is protecting the community.” This is impact-justified since it **assume**s that **people have a moral obligation to preserve their ability to formulate morality**. (It’s just like the Bostrom extinction-first argument.) I’m not aware of any moral theories that place much emphasis on this moral obligation or even prescribe such a moral obligation, much less say it’s the *only* moral obligation. **As long as people are acting correctly, morality doesn’t** seem to **care if they can formulate the rules according to which they’re acting**. So this is not only impact-justified, but it seems even less plausible than the old impact-justified frameworks: At least when people assumed consequentialism, they were making an assumption that many people believe is true. (Here I’m reading the argument charitably. If it’s not impact-justified, then it conflates the pre- and post-fiat distinction: as debaters in this round, we are capable of formulating morality whether or not the people in the post-fiat world can do so.) You can also see the same disconnect here as in the old impact-justified frameworks between marginal links to the standard and the justification for the standard**: Even if it’s necessary** to have a community, **it doesn’t follow that any harm** to the community short of destroying it **is bad.** 2. “You can’t know anything if you don’t know your own ontology, and respect for the Other is required to formulate an ontology. Thus, the standard is respecting the Other.”This **[other] argument[s] assume**s **we have an obligation to know stuff**. Not obviously true, and almost definitely outweighed by other impacts. Also, like other impact-justified frameworks, **the argument artificially excludes** other impacts to knowing stuff: if there are **other things that are necessary for us to know stuff**, those would also matter. **Another problem** with both examples here is that **they justify necessity but not sufficiency**. Even if respecting the Other or protecting the community is *necessary* to fulfill some moral obligation, it doesn’t follow that it’s sufficient.I could go on and on with more examples (discourse ethics is another one, as well as frameworks that say we need to help out some particular group because otherwise our theory of morality will be epistemically biased), but they all follow the same basic form. What’s frustrating is that hardly anyone points out the fundamental problems with these sorts of impact-justified frameworks.Maybe this is because these arguments are commonly paired with an argument that “epistemology/ontology comes first because it determines how we know morality in the first place” or something to that effect. This kind of rhetoric seems to make debaters give the arguments more credence than they should. Rather than shying away the moment someone says “comes first,” opponents should break these arguments down into their steps. This should make their impact-justified form clear. Let’s maintain the advance we had five years ago in framework debate rather than sliding backwards into an even worse form of impact-justified standards.

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7. Walter Sinnot-Armstrong. Moral Skepticisms. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
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   [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. C.S. Lewis [Christian apologist and writer] “Mere Christianity” (1943) [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. CS Lewis [Christian apologist, novelist and philosopher] “Mere Christianity” (1943) [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
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12. Walter Sinnot-Armstrong. Moral Skepticisms. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
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14. Moral Skepticisms. Walter Sinnot Armstrong. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. [ibid] [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. [ibid]. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Emily Massey [former debater and coach for Walt Whitman and my hero]. “The New Impact Justified Standards.” NSD Update. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)